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Summary
What are the conditions under which external actors positively influence de-
mocratization? A growing literature analyzes the external dimension of de-
mocratization, focusing, for instance, on the power of EU enlargement con-
ditionality to spur democratic reform in the post-communist world, and 
especially the Balkans. This paper compares the effect of Western leverage 
over transitions in the Balkans and the Arab Spring countries. Western demo-
cratic leverage is a function of external power and internal vulnerability to ex-
ternal democratizing pressure, but it is also related to factors such as Western 
political will, the influence of countervailing external powers, and nationalist 
resistance. The article demonstrates that on all of these dimensions, Western 
democratic leverage over the Arab Spring countries is significantly lower than 
it has been over the Balkan states, and thus that the prospects for democratiza-
tion in states such as Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia are dimmer.
Keywords: Arab Spring, Democratization, Democracy Promotion, Balkans, 
Conditionality
Introduction
What are the conditions under which external actors positively influence transitions 
to democracy? As democracy has expanded around the globe in recent decades and 
become a norm enshrined in the conditionality policies of international organizations 
such as the European Union (EU) and international financial institutions like the 
World Bank, the external factor has taken an increasingly central role in the research 
agendas of social scientists seeking to understand processes of democratization.1 
1 Recent examples of research that examine the international context of democratic transition 
include Donno (2013) and Youngs (2012).
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Democratic transitions in post-communist Europe, and especially the Balkans, 
cannot be understood without reference to external leverage. The first decade of 
transition in a number of Balkan states was deeply troubled, marred by war and the 
dominance of nationalist-authoritarian regimes. Yet, in the second decade of tran-
sition (after 2000), under the close watch of the EU, the Balkan countries imple-
mented democratic reforms so that by the second decade of the new millennium all 
countries in the region were firmly on the European path, with Croatia becoming a 
full member of the EU in 2013.
The ‘Arab Spring’, which started in Tunisia in 2010 and spread throughout the 
region in 2011, initially raised expectations of a ‘fourth wave’ of democratization, 
but major setbacks, such as the July 2013 military coup in Egypt and the civil war in 
Syria, have put on a damper on the euphoria of those heady months when ordinary 
people across the region rose up against corrupt and authoritarian regimes. Look-
ing ahead, can Western leverage over the Arab Spring states play the positive role it 
did in the Balkans in terms of encouraging democratization? This article represents 
an initial effort to understand the scope and limits of Western democratic leverage 
in the Arab Spring, especially in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the three countries that 
have experienced the greatest extent of regime change in the region. 
The first section of the article compares the initial conditions of transition in 
the Balkans and the Arab Spring states, illustrating that, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, on many internal dimensions the Balkan countries were no better prepared 
for democratic transition than their Arab Spring counterparts. It will briefly review 
some of the literature on EU conditionality and its role in stimulating liberal demo-
cratic reforms. It will show that in the Balkans, owing to Western interests, will and 
resources, and the parallel absence of anti-democratic outside powers, the power of 
external democratic leverage was high and thus the international context was more 
favorable to democratization. 
The second part of the article will explain why the international context in 
which the Arab Spring transitions are taking place is much less favorable to de-
mocratization than the external context in which Balkan states underwent demo-
cratization over the past decade. Western democratic leverage over the Arab Spring 
countries is weaker in part because the will to pursue a pro-democracy agenda faces 
many competing Western interests, such as security. The will to push democracy in 
the Arab world is further weakened by recession in Western countries and a general 
fatigue on the part of both policy-makers and the public with the perceived failure 
of ‘nation-building’ projects in Afghanistan and Iraq, continuing instability in Tu-
nisia, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen, as well as ongoing war in Syria. Western demo-
cratic leverage over the Arab Spring countries is also compromised by a serious 
‘credibility gap’ in terms of Arabs’ perceptions of Western intentions. Finally, West-
ern democratic leverage over the Arab Spring is lowered by sensitivities related to 
Boduszyński, M., Comparing Western Democratic Leverage: From Tirana to Tripoli
191
sovereignty and the rise of nationalism, as well as the influence of anti-democratic 
countervailing powers, especially those in the Gulf. 
Comparing the Initial Conditions and the International Context of Transition
In both the Balkans and the Arab Spring countries, domestic conditions were not 
ripe for democratization. It’s not that ordinary people didn’t genuinely want demo-
cracy, but there were serious obstacles to building it, such as economic underdeve-
lopment, a lack of democratic institutions and traditions, and deep ethnic divisions. 
As a result, at the outset of transition, conditions were not any more hospitable to 
democratization in states such as Bosnia, Albania, Bulgaria or Romania than they 
were in Libya, Egypt, or Tunisia. Consider the case of Albania. In 1991, on the eve 
of its transition, Albania was far poorer and more isolated than Libya, Tunisia, or 
Egypt in 2011. Much like Libya today, in the late 1990s the Albanian state was weak 
and the country was awash in arms and militias operating outside the control of the 
central government. Yet, today Albania is a functioning, albeit troubled, democracy. 
Prior to 1989, Bulgaria had no independent media, political parties, or civil soci-
ety, while today it is a member of the EU. Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and Kosovo have deeper and more divisive ethnic divisions than most Arab Spring 
countries, and yet they are all democracies, however deeply flawed and dysfunc-
tional. Furthermore, most Balkan and Arab countries share an Ottoman imperial 
heritage, which scholars have shown provided a weaker foundation for democracy 
than Western-style feudalist institutions (Blaydes and Chaney 2013). Table 1 con-
trasts the initial conditions of transition in a selection of Balkan and Arab Spring 
countries on a variety of dimensions, showing that the Balkan states were no better 
prepared for democracy than their Arab counterparts.












Tunisia $9454 (2010) Some Limited Ottoman Low
Egypt $6417 (2010) Some Limited Ottoman Medium
Libya $13,845 (2010) None None Ottoman Medium
Albania $2630 (1990) None Limited Ottoman Low 
Macedonia $5774 (1991) Some None Ottoman High
Bulgaria $7174 (1990) None Limited Ottoman Medium
Source: GDP per capita numbers are based on World Bank figures. www.worldbank.org 
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Of course there were some key internal differences between the two regions. 
One was the role of the military, which in Arab Spring states such as Egypt and Sy-
ria (and earlier Algeria) has emerged as a powerful anti-democratic force. By con-
trast, in the Balkans and other post-communist states in East and Central Europe, 
militaries were largely de-politicized and, following the collapse of communism, 
did not attempt to thwart the momentum toward democratic change. Another differ-
ence lay in the nature of the ‘triple’ transitions that have played out in the Balkans 
over the past two decades (Offe 1997): a transition from authoritarianism to demo-
cracy, a transition from a centrally planned to a market economy, and for the succes-
sor states of the former Yugoslavia, a transition to independent statehood. The Arab 
states, by contrast, underwent economic reform in earlier decades, and at least so far 
have emerged from the Arab Spring with pre-2011 borders intact, though both Syria 
and Yemen face tendencies toward disintegration. 
While these internal differences are significant, none of them are decisive as 
determinants of successful democratization in the Balkans. If anything, a triple tran-
sition should complicate, rather than enable, democratization. And while a military 
‘veto’ over democracy in the Middle East goes far in explaining recent democratic 
reversals in Egypt, it cannot account for the challenges to democratization in Libya 
and Tunisia, where militaries do not play a parallel anti-democratic role. 
I suggest that a central difference between the Balkans in the 2000s and the Ar-
ab Spring countries in the 2010s lies not in the domestic factors enumerated above, 
but rather in the international context of transition in the two regions. More specifi-
cally, the contrast is between two very different degrees of Western leverage over 
democratization. Levitsky and Way (2010) have advanced a useful theory of how 
external forces shape democratic transitions using the concepts of leverage (the de-
gree to which governments are vulnerable to external democratizing pressure) and 
linkages (the density of economic, political, social, diplomatic and organizational 
ties to the West and cross-border flows of trade, communication, investment and 
people with the West). They argue that in order for competitive authoritarianism to 
turn into substantive democracy, high degrees of Western leverage need to be com-
plemented by strong linkages with Western countries. While Levitsky and Way’s 
goal is primarily to account for how the external realm can contribute to shaping 
various forms of hybrid democracy, their elaboration of how and when Western le-
verage can shape democratization is useful here. 
Along with Levitsky and Way’s work on competitive authoritarianism, a large 
literature on the role of EU conditionality policies in building democratic institu-
tions and encouraging democratic reforms in the Balkans and East Central Europe 
has appeared in recent years. While the EU did not invent conditionality, it has per-
fected its use. Conditionality links ‘perceived benefits for another state (such as aid, 
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trade concessions, cooperation agreements, political contacts, or international or-
ganization membership), to the fulfillment of conditions relating to the protection of 
human rights and the advancement of democratic principles’ (Smith 1998). Indeed, 
the EU has tied the accession of new candidates to a set of intrusive reform criteria 
that were first outlined by the Copenhagen Council in 1993, and were then opera-
tionalized and expanded in subsequent enlargement documents. That these condi-
tions come with sizable rewards for post-communist elites, especially the highly 
attractive promise of membership, increases the effectiveness of the policy. More-
over, candidate countries have no influence in the making of the rules that regulate 
their advance in the accession process. The asymmetrical power that the EU holds 
in this process, when combined with the high volume and intrusiveness of the rules 
attached to membership, has led to a top-down process of Europeanization, and has 
given the EU unprecedented influence over the restructuring of domestic institu-
tions and the entire range of public policies in Eastern and Central Europe (Kubicek 
2003). 
The literature on EU enlargement conditionality has shown that democratiza-
tion was faster and less prone to reversals in countries sharing a credible EU mem-
bership perspective (Pop-Eleches 2007: 142). Indeed, enlargement policy is seen 
as responsible for the quick, coinciding and, to some degree, convergent economic 
and political reforms throughout the post-communist countries of Eastern and Cen-
tral Europe. Thus, EU democratic conditionality has long been considered the most 
successful EU foreign policy tool, which has encouraged stability, economic reform 
and democratization in the Balkans. 
However, if conditionality is a uniform policy, and the attraction of member-
ship is equal across space and time, we must still explain the divergent reform 
paths in target countries (Elbasani 2013). One strand of Europeanization research 
attributes a dominant role to the specifics of EU strategy, especially the top-down 
policy of conditionality, when explaining the scope of domestic change (Schim-
melfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). An alternative approach to Europeanization 
adopts a more sceptical view of the EU’s strategy and influence over the candidate 
countries. Critics of the EU, and other external factors more generally, share the 
concern that it is important not to ‘overestimate the EU influence’ (Grabbe 1997: 
305) or focus exclusively on the EU over sources of domestic change. Top-down 
accounts of Europeanization, therefore, call for the need to give more credence to 
domestic factors as the key to explaining the variety and success of EU conditional-
ity across candidate countries (Vachudová 2005; Boduszyński 2010). Levitsky and 
Way’s focus on linkages (networks with the West) provide another possible expla-
nation of varying degrees of compliance with EU conditionality, where countries 
enjoying a greater density of linkages (i.e. Croatia) provide greater reinforcement 
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for external democratic leverage than those with weaker linkages (i.e. Macedo-
nia).
Such differences in approach notwithstanding, scholars agree that the EU pos-
sesses unprecedented democratic leverage thanks to the enlargement incentive, and 
that it is this enormous leverage that accounts for existing liberal democratic re-
forms in the region, however variable or shallow these reforms have been. Yet, it 
would be distorting to see conditionality in isolation from the broader geopolitical 
and strategic context of Western democratic leverage over the Balkans, for it is a 
recognition of this context that brings the contrast between the Balkans and the Ar-
ab Spring into sharp relief.
In explaining the international dimension of democratization, we are also faced 
with the task of explaining the degree to which democracy-building is part of a 
Western country’s agenda, given that the pro-democracy content of Western foreign 
policy varies over space and time. For instance, one may compare robust U.S. pro-
democracy policies in Burma (Myanmar) versus its weak push for democracy and 
human rights in the Arab Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia or Bahrain. Or one may 
contrast vigorous EU criticism of authoritarianism in Belarus versus the much more 
muted criticism of democratic transgressions in Kazakhstan. Such differences re-
flect strategic interests, political will, resources, history, domestic politics in West-
ern countries, and a host of other factors. 
One may argue about the quality of democracy that has emerged in the Bal-
kans, or whether policies of Western interventionism and nation-building in coun-
tries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo were good for the long-term 
legitimacy of certain key institutions. But the fact is that Western pro-democra-
cy policies played a critical role in conditioning democratic reforms in the Bal-
kans, and it is doubtful that any democracy would have prevailed were it not for 
Western involvement, and in particular, were it not for the promise of EU member-
ship. 
In the Balkans, Western will, values, interests, strategy and resources, as well 
as geopolitics, converged in favor of strong democratic leverage. The EU and U.S. 
both wanted and pushed for real democracy in the Balkans, especially after 2000. 
The idea of the EU as a ‘community of values’, embodied in the aforementioned 
Copenhagen criteria of 1993, came to guide EU conditionality policies, and rein-
forced the consistent push for democracy in southeastern Europe. The international 
order helped too, in that the countervailing powers (or ‘Black Knights’, as Levi-
tsky and Way call them) which could otherwise be the source of anti-democratic 
counter-leverage were not present. China was not a factor, while Russia was deal-
ing with its own internal problems, with no desire or ability to seriously derail the 
Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the Balkan states (with the possible exception of Ser-
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bia, but even there Russian efforts were lukewarm).2 Geography and related stra-
tegic interests mattered, too. The Balkans were in Europe’s backyard, and besides 
hard security interests – the idea that if Europe did not export security the Balkans, 
they would import insecurity to Europe – the EU and its member states also had an 
economic stake in the region.3 
Since enlargement is a costly process for existing members (and therefore un-
popular with the public), it is difficult to explain it in purely rationalistic terms. This 
is because the project to expand the EU eastward is also based on the desire on the 
part of both the U.S. and EU to validate democracy as a universal value. After all, if 
democracy could not take root on the doorstep of Europe, how could it succeed fur-
ther afield? This kind of thinking underpinned political will in Brussels and Wash-
ington, a will born of the desire to prevent future wars by co-opting the Balkans into 
Euro-Atlantic organizations. Such will permitted the transfer of generous amounts 
of aid (nearly 750 million Euros in pre-accession assistance to the Western Balkans 
in 2011 alone) and a readiness to enforce liberal norms through harder forms of 
power: consider the High Representative’s annulling of elections in Bosnia, or the 
Western-brokered Ohrid Framework Agreement in Macedonia, both backed by the 
presence of Western troops on the soil of these countries. All of this was bolstered 
by identity – the vast majority of Balkan citizens saw themselves as Europeans – 
and both pre-existing and fast-developing ‘linkages’ between the Balkans and the 
West (in trade, civil society, travel, and otherwise). These factors fortified already 
strong Western democratic leverage in the Balkans, and made EU conditionality to 
be as effective.
The Arab Spring and Western Democratic Leverage
Democratization in the Arab Spring countries, of course, does not benefit from the 
incentive of membership in the richest and most technologically sophisticated club 
of nations in the world. Yet, the literature on civil-military relations in Turkey sug-
gests that the Turkish democratic reform process was strengthened by EU involve-
ment and conditionality, despite the absence of a credible offer of full membership. 
However, beyond the applicability of specific policy tools, there is ample evidence 
that both the U.S. and EU simply lack will, strategy and influence over democra-
tization in the Arab world (Atlantic Council 2013). The Obama administration ini-
tially expressed great optimism about the prospects for democracy in the region. 
In a May 2011 speech at the State Department, President Obama vowed to provide 
2 By contrast, Russian involvement has worked to derail democratization in post-Soviet states 
such as Georgia, Armenia, and Ukraine.
3 Witness, for instance, the dominance of Austrian banks in the region.
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diplomatic, economic and strategic aid to boost a swift transition to democracy in 
the Arab Spring countries.4 Since then, his administration’s focus and determina-
tion have dwindled (Landler 2013), while EU policies have been characterized by 
a mismatch between rhetoric and actual commitments of resources. Aid numbers 
are paltry when compared to the assistance that has flowed to the Balkans over the 
past two decades. For instance, in 2012 the Obama administration’s request to Con-
gress for non-military U.S. assistance to all the Arab Spring countries (including 
Yemen, which is desperately poor, and Egypt, which has a population of 85 million) 
was $700 million (Goodenough 2012). The EU’s SPRING program (Support for 
Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth) pledged funds of €65 million in 2011 
and €285 million in 2012. Support was to be tailored to the needs of each country, 
based on an assessment of the country’s progress in building democracy. Tunisia 
and Egypt, for example, were to receive additional financial resources (€160 mil-
lion and €449 million for 2011-2013, respectively). These figures, however, besides 
being a fraction of aid allocated to the Balkans in per capita terms, are far from the 
expectations of the Arab Spring governments, even when one considers alternate 
sources of assistance, such as funds from the Deauville Partnership and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF). But they are especially modest when one consid-
ers the aid flowing to the Arab Spring countries from the Gulf States, discussed 
below.
However, modest financial assistance is just one symptom of a deeper disease, 
which is lack of Western will. Fatigue and frustration with the progress of the Arab 
Spring have taken center stage in Western capitals, and the result is a retreat to well-
trodden patterns of policy behavior, which emphasize interests like stability and se-
curity over attention to democratization. The global economic recession of recent 
years has only exacerbated this, as has lack of progress in Afghanistan and Iraq. For 
domestic political reasons, Western governments have no appetite to put any ‘boots 
on the ground’ in the Arab world, engage in extensive nation-building activities, or 
indeed, to put any Westerners in danger. The Obama administration does not want 
its domestic initiatives, such as immigration and health care reform, to be oversha-
dowed by intractable foreign policy dilemmas.
But the lack of Western will to genuinely promote democracy in the Arab world 
has roots that reach deeper than 2011. The U.S. focus on issues such as counterter-
rorism, peace with Israel, and maintenance of military relationships at the expense 
of democratization (despite momentary rhetoric in support of democracy, such as 
4 See ‘Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa’, available on http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa 
(accessed December 18, 2013).
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George W. Bush’s post-2005 ‘Freedom Agenda’, from which the Bush adminis-
tration largely retreated in 2006)5 is well known (Brownlee 2012). Past EU poli-
cies have similarly suffered from a major gap between rhetoric and actual support 
of democratic processes. The European-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also 
known as the Barcelona Process, was launched in 1995 and contained some gene-
ral principles related to human rights, and some tools for the EU to put pressure on 
countries that violated human rights norms. However, as Balfour (2012: 14) writes, 
‘throughout the years of the EMP, and despite the abundance of cases justifying ap-
plying some pressure, the EU never resorted to negative conditionality in the case 
of the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, with the exception of 
endorsing international sanctions towards Libya in the 1990s’. Nevertheless, the 
EMP was a significant step beyond previous partnership initiatives, which focused 
entirely on trade and economic cooperation (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2011).
The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), formulated in 2003, was another, 
overlapping attempt to encourage democratic reforms in the Arab World. The ENP 
drew on the experience of the EU enlargement process in Europe (Kelly 2006) to 
strengthen conditionality towards the countries in the southern Mediterranean (Bal-
four 2012). It featured ‘Action Plans’ and yearly progress reports on reform in part-
ner countries, similar to EU progress reports on candidate countries such as Albania 
and Croatia (for the latter, until 2013). However, as Balfour (2012: 16) notes, the 
ENP did not take into sufficient account the fact that the ultimate incentive of mem-
bership was missing (the main incentives were aid and trade), not to mention the 
‘fundamentally different understanding of sovereignty and external interference in 
the internal affairs of the state’.
As with the EMP, under the ENP real democratic pressure was rarely exerted 
on the Arab countries. Democratic transgressions were occasionally criticized, but 
repercussions were almost never implemented, and in any case conditionality fo-
cused mostly on economic rather than political reforms (Balfour 2012). For exam-
ple, despite high levels of repression, the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia was rarely criti-
cized, and instead Tunisia made progress on its Association Agreement thanks to 
its neoliberal economic reforms (Balfour 2012: 15). Furthermore, as Balfour (2012: 
13) notes, in order for incentives to be attractive, they need to be delivered. Before 
the Arab Spring as now, certain policies, such as expanding the number of migrants 
allowed to enter Europe, are the policy domain of member states and not the EU as 
a whole, and thus the EU loses leverage when it is unable to deliver the reward. A 
5 See Bush’s speech at his second Inaugural Ceremony, available on http://www.npr.org/tem-
plates/story/story.php?storyId=4460172 (accessed December 18, 2013). The Freedom Agenda did 
result in the creation of democracy-promotion agencies and mechanisms for the Middle East such 
as the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI).
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recent report emphatically notes: ‘The EU does not have a strategic vision because 
the priorities of the member states vary. Some such as France and the United King-
dom have a stronger focus on security; others such as Spain and Italy, focus on mo-
bility and migration; and still others, such as Sweden, the Netherlands and Poland 
are more committed to democratic transition’ (Atlantic Council 2013). 
In the end, as in the case of the U.S., the EU policy repertoire in the Arab world 
has closely followed strategic interests such as resolving the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict, fighting terrorism, stopping the flow of illegal migration, and ensuring access 
to energy – and, as Balfour (2012) notes, these interests were controlled in bilateral 
relationships between individual Arab and EU states, undermining the larger, EU-
wide, policy of democracy promotion. Increasing engagement with Libya in the 
2000s, for example, did little in terms of improving the human rights situation there 
under the former Qadhafi regime (Chorin 2012). 
Interests on the part of the EU and U.S. that competed with promoting de-
mocracy pre-2011 not only undermined Western democratic leverage over Arab 
democratic reform, but also harmed the credibility of democracy promotion efforts 
once authoritarian regimes fell in 2010 and 2011. The credibility gap inherent in 
the many apparent contradictions of Western policies toward authoritarian Arab re-
gimes came to a head in revolutionary Tunisia, where the close relations between 
former French Foreign Minister Michele Aliot and the ruling Ben Ali family, be-
sides deeply embarrassing then-President Sarkozy, showed the depth of entangle-
ment between the French political elite and the Ben Ali regime. Similarly, close 
relations between Qadhafi and former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and 
other European leaders such as former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, which 
were based largely on economic interests related to Libya’s substantial oil wealth, 
also undermined the faith of ordinary Arabs in Western powers as sincere support-
ers of democratic change.6 In the case of the U.S., the fact that many Arabs associ-
ate American democracy promotion with the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the de-
spised policies of George W. Bush more generally (support for Israel, extraordinary 
renditions, torture, Guantanamo, etc.) further lowers the credibility of U.S. policies, 
and thus democratic leverage. 
If, as Levitsky and Way write, leverage depends on the vulnerability of a given 
state to outside democratizing pressures, then we must also consider the role and 
sources of domestic resistance to such pressures. Here too, we find that Western 
democratic leverage is substantially weaker in the Arab Spring cases than the Bal-
kans. Domestic resistance may be rooted in economic alternatives (for instance, 
6 Post-2011 revelations about close cooperation between American and British intelligence 
and Qadhafi’s security services further served to confirm such skepticism. 
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Libya’s oil wealth and dependence on oil exports mean that aid and the promise of 
free trade or investment cannot serve as a major incentive for reform), but it can also 
be rooted in issues of sovereignty and nationalism. Sovereignty has always been a 
political flashpoint in the post-colonial Arab world, and indeed, the 2010-2011 up-
risings and the overthrow of authoritarian regimes coincided with a resurgence of 
nationalism that views any Western interference with suspicion. Throughout the 
region, there is a suspicion of Western motives and a history of rejecting Western 
interference. Widespread perceptions among secular groups (and Coptic Christians) 
in Egypt that the U.S. propped up the Muslim Brotherhood (a stunning turnaround 
in Egyptian public opinion considering that the U.S. shunned the Brotherhood for 
many decades and supported its oppressor, the Mubarak regime) has diminished 
U.S. influence among a natural ally. 
Although political Islam has traditionally been the main locus of resistance to 
Western involvement in Arab affairs (Paz 2003), in Egypt nationalist resistance to 
Western interference comes from both ends of the political spectrum. The attacks 
on Western-funded NGOs in 2012 came from secular, Mubarak-era government of-
ficials, and the state media, rather than the Islamists that dominated Egypt’s short-
lived parliament. In successive polls, Egyptians have clearly voiced their opposition 
to U.S. and IMF economic assistance, with overwhelming majorities (Gallup 2012). 
In Libya, where there is an enormous reservoir of goodwill toward those Western 
countries that participated in the 2011 military intervention that helped bring down 
the Qadhafi regime, there is also firm opposition to Western meddling in Libya’s 
political transition (Gallup 2012). In general, Arabs are unlikely to tolerate the kind 
of heavy-handed, invasive conditionality that was more readily accepted by elites 
(if not always the public) in many Balkan countries. 
Finally, a key difference between the Balkans and the Arab Spring states is the 
influence of powers that play the role of a countervailing force to Western demo-
cratic leverage, especially those located in the Gulf region. Oil-rich Gulf states such 
as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have been heavily involved 
in the Arab Spring countries from the beginning of the uprisings and have provided 
massive infusions of cash that often dwarf those that Western states and international 
financial institutions are able and willing to provide. Each Gulf state (and private 
foundations located in Gulf states) use money to curry favor among various groups. 
For instance, there is a widespread perception in Libya that Qatar has supported Is-
lamist militias. Saudi Arabia was vocal about its dismay at Mubarak’s fall, and never 
forgave the Obama administration for dropping support for his regime. Accordingly, 
just a week after the 3 July 2013 military coup in Egypt, the Saudis announced a 
$12 billion aid package for the country, and a month later, they promised to make up 
any aid cut by Western donors to punish Egypt’s military leaders for their undemo-
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cratic actions (Nordland 2013). During the Morsi government, it was Qatar in turn 
that provided billions of dollars in aid to Cairo, allowing Morsi to avoid negotiat-
ing an unpopular stabilization agreement with the IMF. Western governments were 
left wondering if they even had much to offer to counteract such vast wealth and the 
influence it could buy. Gulf countries have their own interests in the Arab Spring 
countries, and few of these have anything to do with democracy, given their desire 
to preserve their own longstanding undemocratic orders. In the Balkan states, as we 
have noted, the geopolitical context in this regard was more favorable to democrati-
zation, with a notable absence of external anti-democratic leverage.
Conclusions
All of these factors combine to make Western democratic leverage over the Arab 
Spring countries substantially weaker than it was in the Balkans. Given the lack of 
will, and the forces of resistance to Western influence present in the region, demo-
cratic leverage is low, and even receding. Trends in the U.S., which in some ways 
is better equipped to exercise democratic leverage in the Arab World than the EU 
with its still-unwieldy institutions, are extremely unfavorable to further democracy 
promotion in the region. As The New York Times reported, Obama’s October 2013 
speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations signaled a clear shift toward 
greater realism in U.S. policy toward the Arab Spring: ‘Mr. Obama, who hailed 
the crowds on the streets of Cairo in 2011 and pledged to heed the cries for change 
across the region, made clear that there were limits to what the United States would 
do to nurture democracy in [the Arab Spring countries]’ (Landler 2013). It is no 
wonder that U.S. criticism of the Egypt’s military rulers following the 3 July 2013 
coup has been muted. Nor was there vocal criticism on the part of the Obama ad-
ministration when President Mursi unilaterally appropriated extraordinary judicial 
powers for himself in November 2012, precipitating mass protests. As for the EU, to 
a large extent its demands for reform in Egypt are weaker than in the past: whereas 
before Brussels prodded Mubarak to repeal the emergency law, now that the law is 
back, the EU is silent on the subject. As for the ENP, a recent analysis argues that the 
EU approach to democracy promotion in Tunisia and Jordan suffers from a ‘lack of 
analytical depth as far as concepts and processes are concerned’, thereby diminish-
ing its effectiveness (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2011). 
The dream of Arab democracy appears to resonate with certain Western politi-
cians and policy-makers, and yet just as many whisper that Arabs are not ready for 
democracy and need strong rulers. Fewer Western elites were willing to whisper 
that about the Balkans. While the West was ready to attack Milošević for his nation-
alism, it is much less willing to criticize new Arab leaders for xenophobic or anti-
Semitic statements. As a U.S. diplomat in Libya, I watched in frustration and disap-
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pointment as the Obama administration retreated from much-needed engagement 
with the fragile democratically-elected government in Tripoli following the attacks 
on the U.S. mission in Benghazi in September 2012, and as the emphasis returned 
to counterterrorism, as it had been in the last years of the Qadhafi regime. 
Enduring Western interests in the Middle East and North Africa region con-
tinue to incline foreign policy to emphasize security and stability more than de-
mocracy. There is oil, and there is also the perceived need for close cooperation on 
counterterrorism with security agencies that are holdovers from the ancien régime. 
There are ties built over many decades between military and intelligence structures. 
There are deep fears of what ascendant Islamism will bring. For the Europeans, 
there are fears of illegal immigration. For those who believe that Western policies, 
if properly calibrated, could increase the chances for democracy to succeed in the 
Arab Spring countries, all of this is not encouraging. The lack of Western will, and 
the penchant of Western governments to emphasize stability rather than encourage 
democracy, is especially disheartening to the young Arabs who took to the streets 
three years ago to demand democracy, dignity, and justice. 
Indeed, the international context of the Balkan transitions provided much more 
fertile ground for optimism about the development of democracy. In light of these 
challenges, policy-makers in the West need to think anew about what kind of tools, 
if any, are available to encourage democratization in the Arab world. This article has 
only begun to address the issue, but hopefully it will serve as a catalyst for further 
research of the role a host of external actors, from the Arab Gulf states to Turkey to 
Europe and the United States, are playing in the massive changes currently taking 
place across the Arab world, and what this tells us about the possible futures for li-
beral democracy in the Middle East.
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